This paper considers the signifi cance of future harmonization on public sector creative forms of accounting (PSCA) in the context of both national accounting and government fi nancial reporting. The analysis is carried out through a review of studies provided in the academic and offi cial literatures. Examples are provided of PSCA in a 'broad' context of any manipulation of fi nancial information and in a 'focused' context, referring to the reporting of defi cit / surplus and associated levels of debt. The analysis is related to the infl uence of harmonization using the classifi cation of information-manipulating behaviour drawn from Birnberg, Turopolec, and Young (1983) . There is potential for accounting harmonization to improve the analysability of data to restrict PSCA. However, although many techniques of PSCA have been identifi ed, the drivers and controllers of PSCA remain unclear. Accounting researchers should use their specialist understanding to draw out the differences between apparently consistent frameworks of accounting and to understand the policy effects and social implications of harmonization and related creative forms of accounting. There are relatively few studies of PSCA. This paper represents the fi rst study that seeks to relate PSCA to the increasing tendency towards harmonisation of accounting in the public sector context. An agenda is included to guide researchers towards issues that are worthy of further consideration in this important area of study.
Introduction
This paper provides a refl ection of what we know about the purposes, use and impact of public sector creative accounting (PSCA). The objective is to analyse the likely infl uence of future harmonization of public sector accounting on PSCA. In what ways might we expect harmonization to restrict the future incidence of PSCA? Will it lead to new forms of PSCA driven by the very process of harmonization? The paper takes a theoretical stance as the questions can only be answered fully from future, empirical research. The paper uses beliefs in measurability, verifi ability and analysability of data drawn from the work of Birnberg, Turopolec, and Young (1983) as a theoretical lens through which to examine the potential impact of public sector accounting harmonization.
Creative accounting is important for a number of reasons. First, it has been around for a long time and there is no intuitive reason to expect it to disappear, whether or not accounting harmonization is implemented. Parker (1991) warns historians of the danger of taking accounting information at its face value and refers as far back as the second millennium B.C. and the stone cruciform monument from Sippar in Mesopotamia, which is now in the British Museum. The inscriptions are thought to be a forgery designed to strengthen the claim of the temple to its revenues (Parker, 1991) .
Second, PSCA may be seen as a threat to the (limited) trust that citizens may have of their central, regional and local governments and of those who manage public services. If public sector fi nancial information is seen to be unreliable, biased and infected with creative accounting techniques, then it quickly becomes part of 'Fake News', rather than being a bulwark against the manipulation of information. Fundamentally, PSCA is anti-democratic.
Third, researching the existence and impact of PSCA provides both challenges and opportunities for researchers. Challenges include the gaining of access to data, identifying the manipulation of fi nancial information and understanding who has promoted such manipulation and why. The opportunities include overcoming these challenges to provide evidence of how and why PSCA is carried out and its implications for public policy and service delivery. Independent researchers have the potential to disclose robust evidence in a manner that is often impossible for politicians or policy makers (who are wedded to particular party interests) and public sector managers (who are constrained by depend upon reported accounting numbers." The broad implication of creative accounting is that it involves some sort of manipulation in the presentation of accounting data. Such manipulation may be carried out without necessarily breaking laws or the rules of accounting. However, it may be difficult to identify the practical and moral distinctions between creative accounting and fraud; both are designed to mislead users of financial information.
A number of alternative terms are used in the literature 1 . In the corporate sector, the term 'earnings management' is often used, emphasising the importance of reported profits or losses in that context. PSCA will be used in this paper to include accounting fudges (Dafflon & Rossi, 1999) , cooking the books (Clémenceau & Soguel, 2017) , earnings management (Ballantine, Forker, & Greenwood, 2007) , fiscal gimmickry (Koen & van den Noord, 2005) , games (Anthony, 1985) , performance adjustment (Arcas & Marti, 2016) and strategic misrepresentation (Jones & Euske, 1991) .
The manipulation of accounting information is an issue of concern relevant to practitioners, standard-setters and regulators. In a public sector context, such concerns extend to policy makers, politicians, national governments and supra-national institutions. The literature examining creative accounting in the corporate sector (much of which is based upon US data) is much more extensive than PSCA. An interesting comparison can be made between the review of literature on corporate earnings quality in Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) , based on more than 300 published studies, and the working paper of Cardoso and Fajardo (2014) , which identified only 17 PSCA papers.
A distinction is made in this paper between a 'Broad View' and a 'Focused View' of PSCA. The Broad View refers to any attempt to manipulate accounting information, in a public sector context, to influence users. This is a broad view because of the wide scope of financial information used in the public sector and the related decision-making and accountability perspectives that might be influenced by such manipulation.
The Focused View refers to PSCA in the specific context of published financial statements and concentrates on the measurement and presentation of financial performance (reported surplus or deficit) and the recognition and measurement of debt. This narrow view has affinity with the study of earnings management in the corporate sector literature.
The research method adopted is based upon a search for relevant articles, primarily from the academic literature although some reference is also made to publications from national and multinational organizations. The PSCA literature survey by Cardoso and Fajardo (2014) provides a very useful 1 Cardoso and Fajardo (2014) refer to McKee (2005) providing fifteen different terms used to describe the manipulation of financial information. confidentiality clauses in employment contracts and by fears of exposure as whistle-blowers). Of course, some politicians, policy makers and managers will be the very people who have promoted the PSCA and wish to avoid its disclosure, while others may wish to use academic researchers as a conduit to enable exposure of such activities.
The analysis in this paper is drawn largely from existing academic literature. However, the paper is not a formal literature review of PSCA, which is available elsewhere (Cardoso & Fajardo, 2014) . The research methods used or the geographical location of PSCA research studies are not analysed. The paper focuses on the public sector, including central and local government and public services provided by public bodies where profitability or return on capital is not a primary objective. It therefore excludes studies on accounting within for-profit state owned trading corporations as well as creative accounting studies in the private or corporate sector, other than to provide a short comparative assessment at the start. Similarly, it does not seek to analyse non-financial forms of PSCA, although these might be used extensively, particularly when rigid or difficult-to-achieve performance targets are implemented (e.g. Pitches, Burls, & Fry-Smith, 2003) .
The rest of the paper is divided into six further Sections. Section 2 is used to provide an outline definition of creative accounting and a description is given of the research method used for this study. Section 3, seeks reasons to explain why PSCA is carried out and to provide an overview of some of the techniques in use. The conceptual classification of information manipulating behaviour from Birnberg et al. (1983) is introduced. Sections 4 and 5 are used to describe and analyse examples of PSCA. The examples are drawn from empirical literature, varying from single organisation case studies through to statistical analyses of financial data. Section 6 provides discussion, drawing on Birnberg et al. (1983) to link the features and prevalence of PSCA to the harmonization agenda. Section 7 draws the issues together, highlighting some research topics that might be called, rather grandly, a future research agenda linking PSCA to accounting harmonization.
Public sector creative accounting: The broad and focused views
There is no formal definition of 'creative accounting'. Healy and Whalen (1999, p. 368) provide an often-quoted description of 'earnings management' as occurring when "…managers use their judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that reports and capital market returns. The purposes behind manipulation may include the smoothing of profits to influence stock-market perceptions and to reduce the costs of financing; to increase or maximise executive bonuses; to achieve forecasts or externally imposed targets; to avoid contractbased penalties such as loan covenants; and to avoid political costs, that may result in regulatory intervention when results are outside of acceptable measures of performance.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that managers of public sector bodies may have similar incentives to manipulate financial reports, although perhaps without the same level of influence of capital market returns. There are a number of common findings that provide a general understanding of why PSCA occurs.
First, there are contexts where specific financial performance targets are set, typically by a higher legislative authority, or where the meeting of financial targets is important to meet expectations of capital markets and to avoid political costs. For example, EU member states are required to avoid continuing deficits above 3% of GDP and to limit borrowings to no more than 60% of GDP under the terms of the Stability and Growth Pack (SGP). A failure to achieve these targets may result in a country becoming subject to the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP), with resulting financial, social and political costs (European Council, 2011) . In another highstakes example, Drew (2018) reports on the distortion of depreciation charges by local governments in New South Wales, when faced with potential forced amalgamation as a result of the failure to meet financial performance targets.
Second, even if there are no formally imposed financial performance targets, there may be expectations that a public sector body will be managed to achieve a financial result within certain parameters. A public sector organisation may wish to avoid a deficit with the implications of poor financial managements and an inability to 'live within its means'. On the other hand, a large surplus might also result in criticism on the grounds that a public sector entity is not created to maximise financial returns, and that large surpluses suggest that taxes, levies or prices are excessive. For example, Greenwood, Bayliss, and Tao (2017) report that discretionary accruals are managed by public hospitals in England to report small surpluses, as there is an aversion to reporting small losses. Third, the governance structure of public sector entities will often differ considerably from a private corporation, leading to different costs and incentives. There may be short-term political incentives to cheat, particularly before elections, which outweigh longer-term detriments (Reischmann, 2016) . There may be few with sufficient knowledge or incentives to monitor public sector financial statements in detail, so that the likelihood of getting caught is low. In contrast, the political and economic consequences of failing to achieve mandatory description of the problematic nature of identifying PSCA papers 2 . The 17 papers that they had identified were used as the starting point for this study.
The next stage was to use various web-based sources to seek to add relevant published work to the list from Cardoso and Fajardo (2014) . Key phrases, applied in Google Scholar, Web of Science, and the Public Sector Accounting Abstract Repository, were used. These were useful in identifying fourteen relevant studies amongst what was often many 'false hits '. 3 Hard copy lists of the contents of some accounting journals 4 are maintained and the titles of papers published since 2013 for those linked to PSCA were worked through, referring to the abstracts in cases of uncertainty in the scope of a paper. This was potentially important because the terminology used in titles and key words for creative accounting studies is quite diverse and would not necessarily be discovered through a word search, although only one further paper was identified during this stage.
The resulting list of papers is given in the Appendix. The first seventeen papers are those identified in Cordoso and Fajardo (2014) while the others are those identified from my additional searches.
Purposes and methods of creative accounting
In the private sector, there are many studies that indicate the use of creative accounting methods (e.g. Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011) . Such studies concentrate on corporates that have one or more types of publically quoted securities, presumably because of the more significant agency issues in this type of corporation arising from the separation of management and ownership interests and because of the availability of information from financial 2 For example, Cardoso and Fajardo locate 144 papers from their initial literature search, but their subsequent reading and assessment of each paper leads them to conclude that only 17 papers have PSCA as the primary contextualization and focus of study. 3 For example, the Web of Science locator TS=("government" AND "earnings management") OR TS=("public sector" AND "earnings management") resulted in 208 hits. However, a subsequent review of the titles and abstracts left only four papers with the focus required for this study (one of which was already included in the Cardoso and Fajardo list). 4 The journals selected were Abacus; Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal; Accounting in Europe; Accounting Forum; Accounting, Organizations & Society; British Accounting Review; Critical Perspectives on Accounting; European Accounting Review Financial Accountability & Management and Public Money & Management. A starting date of 2013 was chosen because the Cardoso and Fajardo study refers to papers up to 2013, so that it seemed likely that earlier studies published in major accounting journals would have been identified in their study.
believe are likely to be accepted by principals to support proposals while downplaying, or even ignoring, other issues that throw poorer light on the proposals.
Finally, Cell 4 (low analysability; low measurability) provides the most diffi cult set of circumstances for the principals to interpret the measurability, validity and analysability of the data. Interestingly, Birnberg et al. (1983) interpret this situation as akin to the evaluation of social programs and to public sector allocation decisions 5 ; concluding that a formalistic approach to decision-making is less effective than methods that take account of specifi c circumstances and contexts.
The Birnberg et al. (1983) model will be used to support analysis and discussion in subsequent sections.
Broad view examples of PSCA studies
In Section 2, the "Broad View" of PSCA was described as any attempt to manipulate accounting information to infl uence users. In this section, the "Focused View" of PSCA, used to manipulate the reporting of defi cit / surplus or the reporting of debt, was excluded as this will be considered in Section 5.
Four examples of broad view PSCA are described here: (a) the manipulation of revenues; (b) the manipulation of data used in league tables; (c) creative accounting to provide a 'just' or 'fair' result; and (d) data manipulation to meet other fi nancial targets.
First, there are circumstances where revenue measurement is determined by externally regulated formulae with suffi cient fl exibility in their application to enable manipulation through the reclassifi cation of activities within the regulated structure. Legried and Neby (2016) provide a case study of this type of manipulation based upon the application of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) and Activity-Based Funding (ABF) in Norwegian Hospitals. Various gaming mechanisms are used, including false diagnosis of patients putting them into 5 The implication of this Birnberg et al. (1983) comment that private sector decision-making is somehow 'better' or 'more reliable' than that in the public sector is not accepted. Birnberg et al. (1983, p. 126) state that "This does not mean that all or even the majority of the public sector evaluation/resource allocation decisions are cell 4 or that no private sector decisions are".
targets set by higher authorities may be substantial, both to the organisation and its managers.
An interpretation of the circumstances leading to the manipulation of accounting information is shown in Figure 1 , which is adapted from Birnberg et al. (1983) . They suggest that information-manipulating behaviour is infl uenced by two beliefs concerning the accounting data used to support decision-making. The fi rst of these is the extent to which accounting data is believed to be measureable and verifi able as representing the conditions that they purport to represent. In Figure 1 a distinction is made between high belief, for which the data is taken to be measured and verifi able without the need to incur excessive audit costs, and low belief, for which considerable audit time and expense is needed to gain such assurance. The second belief is that data can be analysed to confi rm its appropriateness for decision-making. The authors interpret each scenario in the context of management accounting decisions in the private sector: managers are the 'principal actors' who seek to ensure that decisions are made that are consistent with their own desires or to benefi t the organisation. The subordinates are the 'agents', who seek to use their greater knowledge to ensure that decisions are not contrary to their own interests.
In Cell 1, there is high belief in the measurability, reliability and analysability of accounting data. This is seen to eliminate much of the opportunity to manipulate data for decision-making purposes. The agents select projects that are consistent with the desires of the principals. Birnberg et al. (1983) suggest that it is rarely possible to encounter a Cell 1 situation in practice.
In Cell 2 (high analysability; low measurability-verifi ability), the principals know the questions to ask but cannot easily evaluate the validity of the answers. Agents put forward the best possible set of results, as it is diffi cult for the principals to analyse the data. There may be biasing or gaming of data because of its low measurability and verifi ability.
In Cell 3 (low analysability; high measurability-verifi ability), the principals cannot be sure that they are asking the right questions. The agents tell the truth, as there is a greater chance of false data being identifi ed than in Cell 2. However, agents will carefully select which truths to tell in support of their desired course of action, emphasising those which they that the Ministry of Defence altered the allocation of costs making up the UK defence budget and, by doing so, the UK defence allocation for 2016 was increased from 1.97% to 2.08% of GDP, so achieving the pledge to NATO.
While these examples differ in respect of location, sector and timing they appear to have some similarity in that all seek to create or achieve particular targets; a common feature in the public sector where multiple targets (both financial and non-financial) may be set by higher authorities. Note that the targets may be set explicitly, as in the case of the 2% of GDP defence target set by NATO members. Alternatively, the targets may develop through the application of the accounting process such as the achievement of 'average' performance in the UK NRCE system and identification of a 'just' rate of interest to support borrowing in 16 th century Naples. These appear to be examples of Cell 2 type manipulations from Birnberg et al. (1983) ; there is belief in the analysability of the targets but biasing and gaming are used by the reporting entities to achieve their objectives.
Some focused examples of PSCA studies
Some types of PSCA focus on the reporting of deficits / surpluses and on the level of debt. These are likely to be particularly significant metrics in any set of financial statements. They become of even greater importance if there are targets to avoid economic or political penalties. Such measures were important in the run-up to European Monetary Union (EMU) and are explicit in the SGP of the European Union.
Reporting deficits and debt in the context of EMU and SGP Typical circumstances of PSCA are those of hard targets (either rigid and / or difficult to achieve) combined with 'soft' accounting that provides flexibility of accounting treatment, including the potential to move gains or losses into or out of the accounting boundary. Irwin (2012) analyses accounting devices used to create fiscal illusions in national accounts. The basis of his analysis is that the immediate impact of such devices is to create (by implication artificially) increased revenue or decreased expenditure, but that the future impact is either more spending or reduced revenue. He provides a comprehensive list of examples from many different countries. Borrowings may be hidden by excluding those arising from pension transactions, sale and leaseback and certain derivative liabilities. Disinvestment results from the sale of assets to reduce borrowings or the securitization of future revenues. Deferred spending includes deferring maintenance and other current payments. Foregone investments include cutting back on capital payments and the use of concessions to replace direct public sector investment in infrastructure.
higher DRG income categories, reclassifying patients into more lucrative DRG categories, over provision of services to low-severity patients and selecting patients in high-profit or low-cost DRG categories. Accountability mechanisms are multiplied, but are not seen to generate trust for effective working between officials.
Second, accounting or financial data may be used to determine the position of a public sector entity within a 'league table' of similar organisations and such league tables may have a high media profile. The objective of data manipulation is to show the entity in good light, which does not necessarily mean that the entity wishes to be at the top of the league table. An illustration is shown in the impact of the National Reference Costing Exercise (NRCE) in UK hospitals from 1998. The NRCE was linked to activity based funding dependent upon the average cost of various treatments (Llewellyn & Northcott, 2005) . Hospital costs under NRCE were incorporated into league tables. The study shows how hospitals sought to be 'average' under NRCE. Being a highcost hospital was interpreted as 'bad news' because it had the implications of wastefulness and poor financial management as well implying losses on particular treatments. However, being low cost was also considered by hospital managements to be detrimental with its implications of lower quality and inadequate resources. Llwellyn and Northcott (2005) report that hospitals became 'more average' over a five year period, with an increase in the proportion of hospitals reporting results close to the mean.
Third, accounting data might be manipulated to provide a 'just' (or 'fair' or 'appropriate') measure of some variable. The objective is to show the organisation in good light, i.e. working to some measure of high or appropriate standards. Marino (1993) provides an intriguing study of creative accounting in the age of Philip II of Spain. The case refers to the prepayment of additional taxation by the Kingdom of Naples to Spain in the 1570s. The documents at the time refer to an interest rate of 9% under the arrangement, although this is later recomputed as only 3.3%. The implicit rate of interest using modern discounting methods would be around 7.1%. The author concludes that accountants working on behalf of Philip II sought to convince various parties of the validity of the scheme by using different computations of the interest rate. The paper (p. 777) highlights that modern views about financial arrangements are 'as much constructed mathematical constructs as any other'.
Fourth, data might be manipulated to meet some target, but one which does not come within the focused view of overall surplus / deficit or level of debt. A recent example of the strategic use of creative accounting is illustrated in the computation of UK defence spending in the light of promises of NATO members to spend 2% of GDP for defence purposes.
The House of Commons Defence Committee (2016) highlights
The findings from studies of the SFA are mixed. According to von Hagen and Wolff (2006) , countries in surplus tend to buy assets, rather than reducing debt, while those with a change in debt above 3% use SFA to manage their reported deficit. Buti, Martins, and Turrini (2007) found that SFA increases when deficits are above the SGP threshold. Bernoth and Wolff (2008) finds that disclosure of the use of PSCA increases the risk premia on government bonds although this effect is lower following EMU; a factor that the authors put down to increased credibility of European institutions and the perceived increase in likelihood of a bail-out. Weber (2012) found SFA to be significantly lower for countries with a higher transparency index score. However, Seiferling (2013) found that there was no significant variance between SFA and fiscal transparency once controlled for banking crises, inflation and fiscal rules. There is some evidence that SFA increase in the year of elections (Buti et al., 2007) , while Reischmann (2016) , examining OECD countries up to 2011, found evidence that SFA are used strategically before regular elections to hide or reduce reported budget deficits.
A general limitation of many SFA studies is that they fail to consider differences in the detailed of accounting methods used in the computation of surplus or deficit; an exception being Jesus and Jorge (2016) which examines the detailed accounting methods the governments of Portugal, Spain and Italy.
PSCA to achieve Near Break-Even (NBE) It was mentioned earlier that public sector entities might be reluctant to report deficits or large surpluses, preferring instead to report a result near to break-even. Anthony (1985) gives an early indication of methods used, in the context of US local and state governments, to manipulate financial results. The cash basis of accounting is found wanting as it allows income or expenses to be omitted from financial reports by the simple expedient of delaying the payment of expenses or not accepting receipts until the following reporting period. However, accrual accounting is also found to be prone to manipulation through the use of special fund accounts that are not consolidated within the boundary of the authority. Similar forms of manipulation involving the use of special funds and the rescheduling of debt payments were reported in UK local government studies around the same period (e.g. Parkinson, 1986; Smith, 1988) .
Several studies examine the impact of levels of discretionary accruals and relate these to the discontinuity of reported results around zero. Ballantine, Forker, and Greenwood (2007) examine the results of English NHS hospitals and find a spike in reported income just above zero, which is eliminated after the removal of discretionary accruals. Pina, Arcas, and Marti (2012) in a study of UK executive agencies find, similarly, that earnings-increasing discretionary accruals More generally, Irwin refers to "disappearing government" when debt or similar obligations are moved outside of the general government boundary.
The period leading to the EMU appears to be an explicitly strong example of the use of accounting devices to reduce reported deficits in national accounts (Dafflon & Rossi, 1999) . The period up to and immediately following EMU saw a fall in reported deficits until 2000 when a combination of reducing economic activity and the absence of further windfalls from the sale of mobile bandwidth resulted in deficits starting to increase again. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) finds that a fiscal rule applied when the budget is not transparent leads to more creative accounting than in the case of higher levels of budget transparency. Koen and van den Noord (2005) show that forecasted surpluses of EU member states were continually deferred and they find that the use of accounting gimmicks is strongly correlated to pre-adjusted deficits. A number of authors have described and analysed mechanisms in various European countries to meet EMU and SGP targets including France, Belgium and Germany (Dafflon & Rossi, 1999) , Spain (Montesinos & Vela, 2000) and Italy, Portugal and Greece (Balassone, Franco, & Zotteri, 2007) . A reduction in government assets was found to be strongly correlated with reductions in debt from 1992-97 (Milesi-Ferretti & Moriyama, 2006) , suggesting that EU countries reduced their debts without necessarily improving net worth or future fiscal stability.
Stock-flow adjustments
If all transactions and changes in value applicable to a government are included in its record of income and expenses, then the deficit (or surplus) for the year would equate with the change in debt. This might be called the 'clean deficit', equivalent to clean income surplus in private sector accounting. In practice, the deficit is not a comprehensive measure of all changes in debt so there may be differences between the deficit and the change in debt, referred to as the Stock-Flow Adjustment (SFA). If the SFA were generated by random events, it would, over time, be evenly distributed around a mean of zero. In fact, research evidence suggests that the SFAs have been positive during the run-up to EMU and in the SGP period since then. A positive SFA implies that there are residual causes of debt beyond those included in the deficit. One of the causes of a SFA is the existence of PSCA 6 . Birnberg et al. (1983) analysis. The reported transactions may be regulated and audited to high standards, but it is what is not included in the reported figures that becomes significant. For example, revenue, costs, assets and liabilities might all be excluded from reported figures through the use of fund accounting outside the consolidation boundary (Anthony, 1985) or accounting devices are used which rely on the exclusion of economic events, particularly through off-balance sheet financing arrangements (Irwin, 2012) .
Analysis and discussion
In this section, the Birnberg et al. (1983) model is used to analyse the potential effects of the future harmonization of public sector accounting. The discussion is limited here to the forms of PSCA that focus on reported deficit and debt, because the wider forms of PSCA may not be linked to the forms of general-purpose financial reports that will be affected by the harmonization agenda. The Birnberg et al. (1983) model was shown in Figure  1 as four cells that depend upon belief in the analysability, measurability, verifiability of the accounting data. They suggest that Cell 4 is more akin to public sector allocation decisions than in the private sector. If the project for harmonization of public sector accounting proceeds with some degree of success, this ought to result in more national governments (together with sub-national governments and other parts of the public sector) following similar accounting practices. Intuitively, it is suggested that this should increase the potential for belief in the analysability of accounting data, particularly in the context of comparative international government accounting research and evaluation. For example, the inconsistencies in reporting national accounting deficits and debt (and the resulting SFAs) could be reduced if there were greater consistency in definition and measurement. Figure 2 represents this as the vertical arrow moving from Cell 4 to Cell 2.
A second impact of harmonization might be to increase belief in the measurability and verifiability of accounting data. For example, harmonization resulting in an increasing use of accrual-accounting systems by governments might promote a view that a more holistic presentation of financial position and performance is being presented in public sector financial statements. If this is backed up by strong and consistent quality of public audit, then belief about verifiability might also be improved. Figure 2 represents this by the horizontal arrow moving from Cell 4 to Cell 3.
However, some caution is needed in accepting these assumptions. Harmonized accounting practices will not remove the need for judgement in the construction of accrualbased accounts as the deficit and net asset positions will still rely, inter alia, on the measurement of discretionary accruals.
are used mainly when pre-managed earnings are negative. Ferreira, Carvalho, and Pinho (2013) also find a discontinuity of earnings around zero in a study of local government in Portugal and that there is more earnings management for preelection years in areas of strong political competition before, but not after, local elections. Similarly, Arcas and Marti (2016) find, in an English local government study, that almost all authorities with pre-managed deficits use income-increasing accruals. Clemencau and Soguel (2017) find that those Swiss Cantons with pre-managed surpluses are more likely to apply additional depreciation charges. Pilcher and van der Zahn (2010) examine local government in New South Wales and find that additional depreciation charges are linked to higher losses and higher surpluses rather than NBE conditions. The manipulation of reported earnings may be linked to the setting of financial targets by regulatory authorities. For example, Greenwood et al. (2017) report that foundation trusts in the NHS in England use discretionary accruals to increase income when pre-managed results are below intervention thresholds and income-decreasing adjustments when pre-managed results are well above the intervention level.
Several studies seek to test the link between PSCA and political factors, such as the impact of elections and political control of the relevant government. Stalebrink (2007) , in a study of municipalities in Sweden, find that additional depreciation charges are linked to large surpluses and deficits and the study finds that a change of political control is not significant to the measurement of PSCA. Cleamenceau and Soguel (2017) also find that the political ideology of finance ministers does not influence the use of additional depreciation charges.
Obligations off balance sheet
Another group of PSCA techniques are those designed to keep obligations off the public sector balance sheet (in financial reporting terms), which may contribute towards its exclusion from figures of government debt under SNA/ESA. Such techniques include the restructuring of public entities to avoid their consolidation into general government budgets and the use of public private partnerships (Benito, Montesinos, & Bastida, 2008; Hodges & Mellett, 2012) together with the use of subsidisation transfers from outside the entity boundary to balance the budget (Vinnari & Nasi, 2008) . More generally, at least within the EU, there is an increasing use of guarantee schemes to avoid direct borrowing, with resulting reliance on the adequacy of boundary definitions and provisioning for liabilities within accounting reports (Bergmann, 2014; Eurostat, 2018; Heald & Hodges, 2018) .
A common feature in many of these PSCA techniques is the importance of the boundary of the reporting entity and the significance of consolidation to capture economic events within that boundary. This is a Cell 3 position using the are adopted from one location to another. Second, regulation combined with surveillance from higher authorities has the potential to provide the very conditions in which creative accounting might fl ourish as organisations or individuals seek to manipulate accounting information to achieve preset targets. Third, accrual accounting, which is likely to underlie such harmonization, is itself open to critique that it is inappropriate for the measurement of the fi nancial position and performance of public sector entities (e.g. Barton, 2011; Biondi, 2016; Ellwood & Newberry, 2007) .
Conclusions and a future PSCA research agenda
PSCA has been around for a long time and is unlikely to disappear as a result of the harmonization of public sector accounting. Indeed, efforts to increase the control and supervision of national governments, sub-national governments and associated public sector entities seem likely to make PSCA as attractive as ever, particularly if 'hard' fi nancial targets are set as part of supervisory regimes. The fi ndings of Milesi-Ferretti (2003) , that creative accounting increases when fi scal rules are applied without budgetary There may be a "counter effect" of harmonization in that tighter regulation of accounting measurement and disclosure of the elements within fi nancial statements encourages the use of PSCA because governments seek to manoeuvre around tighter regulation by means of omission. For example, costs, payments and obligations might be omitted from government accounts by the use of concessions, PPPs and guarantees in place of public sector investment. If this occurs then belief in the comparative analysability of public sector accounts is likely to be lost, moving us from from Cell 2 to Cell 4. Furthermore, if there is an absence of other sources of information about these non-recognised costs and obligations, then belief in the measurability and verifi ability of the totality of data is also reduced, moving us from Cell 3 to Cell 4. The white arrows in Figure 2 represent these changes.
Can harmonization of public sector accounting lead to the 'nirvana' of Cell 1 with high belief in the measurability, verifi ability and analysability of public sector accounting data? Such an outcome seems over-optimistic for a number a reasons. First, harmonization implies only that general principles for accounting are followed, not that there is complete standardisation of accounting that would remove the need to assess particular methods of accounting that Harmonization increases the availability of accounting information using similar accounting techniques, enabling deeper comparative analysis that increases belief in the analysability of data (moving from Cell 4 to Cell 2).
Harmonization promotes a view that a more holistic presentation of fi nancial position and performance are presented, increasing belief in the measurability and verifi ability of data (moving from Cell 4 to Cell 3).
The counter effect. Harmonization increases PSCA because governments manoeuvre around more extensive accounting rules by means of omission of economic events. This reduces belief in the analyzability of data (Cell 2 to Cell 4) and in its measurability and verifi ability if the relevant data is not disclosed elsewhere (Cell 3 to Cell 4).
all, "accrual accounting may not mean accrual accounting" (Falkman & Tagesson, 2008) . Second, what harmonization factors limit the use and impact of PSCA? There is the potential for more consistent accounting treatment and disclosure, perhaps following IPSAS or based on rules and standards developed through Eurostat.
Research might include the analysis of particular parts of the public sector within a country and comparative international governmental accounting research. Such studies should cover both technical aspects (such as consolidations, associates and joint ventures, measurement methods, and provisioning for pensions and guarantees) as well as the political and organizational issues around who controls and implements the harmonization process within each jurisdiction?
Third, how are social outcomes affected by harmonization and the prevalence of PSCA? It would be appropriate for accounting academics to be working within multi-disciplinary research teams to help assess the impact of the harmonization of public sector accounting and related financial manipulations on public sector resource allocation decisions. Indeed, the impact on PSCA of the changing circumstances of the public sector under conditions of austerity can only be assessed by rigorous, empirical research within and across national borders.
transparency, may not apply if accounting harmonization extends beyond historical financial reporting to also include improved transparency of budgeting and fiscal sustainability procedures.
The application of harmonized regimes of accounting within rigid supervisory systems may result in renewed efforts of some preparers to seek out and exploit flexibility within standards. Issues relating to the setting of the consolidation boundary and those accounting areas requiring judgement in circumstances of incomplete information (such as provisions and contingencies) seem particularly vulnerable to future PSCA possibilities (Bergmann, 2014; Heald & Hodges, 2018) .
Many techniques of PSCA have been identified, but their drivers and extent of use remain unclear. A similar comment may be made as that related to the private sector context in Healy and Wahlen (1999) , which is that the research literature is of little use to standard setters and regulators. This problem is exacerbated as a result of the research community having little impact over the development of the accounting regulation that underlies future accounting harmonization. The efforts of individual and groups of scholars 7 seeking to influence the development of national and international regulation will remain important.
The examination of PSCA is linked to differences between national accounting / government financial statistics and that of government financial reporting. There is an argument for closer links between the communities and methods of accounting (e.g. Jones, 2000) , requiring improved harmonization of both financial reporting and national accounting methods (Lüder, 2000) . An alternative approach would be to accept the differences of purpose and approach of forms of government accounting, in which case reconciliations between the various methods of accounting become essential to help understanding and to allow the different sets to be mutually supporting (Irwin, 2015) .
There are a number of issues on the linkages between PSCA and harmonization that are worthy of further consideration and studies.
First, which particular accounting standards or rules are used to implement PSCA? We need to use our specialist knowledge as accounting academics to understand the techniques in use. This is something largely missing from econometric studies, which concentrate upon the statistical analysis of large data sets. What comprises the SFA or other reconciliations between accrual and cash based figures? As more countries move to adopt forms of accrual accounting, we must consider how similar or different are the techniques in use for national accounting and financial reporting purposes? After
